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Abstract
Indivisible labour is not the only type of nonconvexity aﬀecting labour
supply decisions. Another type of nonconvexity arises in economies with
sectors whenever individuals can work in only one sector at a time. I
introduce this restriction into an open economy model with a tradeable
and a nontradeable sector, and I use lotteries to convexify the consump-
tion possibilities set. This approach implies that the aggregate elasticity
of labour supply becomes infinite. I compare the performance of the
model with an analogous model in which the labour supply elasticity is
finite. I find that the infinite labour supply elasticity helps explain the
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persistence of net exports. However, all the other consequences of the
labour supply elasticity for the model-implied second-order moments de-
pend on whether the pricing assumption is Producer Currency Pricing
(PCP) or Local Currency Pricing (LCP).
JEL classification: E24; E32; F41.
Keywords: Tradeable and nontradeable sectors; International business cy-
cles; Labour supply elasticity.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the performance of a two-country model with tradeable
and nontradeable sectors in which individuals cannot supply their labour ser-
vices to both sectors at the same time. Accounting for the non-convexity
arising from this restriction is important for two reasons. First, in real life
most people do not or cannot hold two jobs at the same time. Secondly,
macroeconomists have developed models with non-convexities which reconcile
low individual labour supply elasticities with the observed large fluctuations
of aggregate hours over the business cycle. In my model, the aggregate labour
supply elasticity is infinite, as in a classic indivisible labour model. I find
that the labour supply elasticity influences the response of wages and prices
to exogenous shocks, but ultimately its impact on the model’s performance
depend on the pricing assumption.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the implications of
a non-standard assumption regarding the allocation of hours worked between
sectors. Many open economy models have two sectors, one producing inter-
nationally traded goods and one producing nontradeable goods, so they must
also specify how individuals choose to allocate their labour time between the
two sectors. The standard assumption is that only the sum of hours worked
enters the utility function. As a result, the representative agent is completely
indiﬀerent between, say, working 20 hours a week in a tradeable sector firm
plus 20 hours in a nontradeable sector firm, and working 40 hours a week
in only one of the two firms. Instead I consider an economy in which indi-
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vidual choices are restricted, either work in one sector or the other, so the
consumption possibilities set is non-convex. This environment was first intro-
duced by Rogerson (1988b). Like him, I assume employment lotteries with
complete markets and I show that the utility function features both the inten-
sive (hours) and the extensive (participation rates) margins of labour supply.
These preferences imply that all the adjustment in the labour supply occurs
through the extensive, not the intensive, margin, and the Frisch elasticity of
the labour supply is infinite.
As it is well known, the observed large fluctuations in aggregate hours im-
ply that the aggregate labour supply elasticity must be large (Prescott 2005).
Moreover, a large labour supply elasticity is important for monetary shocks to
have persistent eﬀects on output (Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 2000). How-
ever, estimated elasticities from microeconometric studies are well below the
calibrated values in macroeconomic models. Seminal work by Hansen (1985)
and Rogerson (1988a) showed that these opposing facts can be reconciled
by assuming that individual agents are only allowed to make the choice as
to whether to be employed or not, but cannot adjust the number of hours
worked. In this environment, the elasticity of the aggregate labour supply is
infinite. Critics of Rogerson’s aggregation consider it to be at odds with mi-
croeconomic observations, because it relies on employment lotteries with com-
plete markets. However, recently Ljungqvist and Sargent (2005, 2011), and
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) have explored an alternative ‘time-averaging’
aggregation, according to which individuals face a {0, 1} employment choice
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in each period and choose what fraction of their lifetime to work. So far, this
debate has not influenced the open economy literature, despite the fact that
a special kind of labour indivisibility arises quite naturally in economies with
sectors (Rogerson 1988b).
Nevertheless, several contributions have uncovered a number of open econ-
omy results which depend on the labour supply elasticity. Basu and Kollmann
(2013) and Kollmann (2010) show that a high labour supply elasticity is nec-
essary to ensure that the real exchange rate depreciates after an increase in
government expenditure, consistently with the empirical evidence. Using a
two-sector dependent economy model, Morshed and Turnovsky (2011) show
that the elasticity of labour supply aﬀects the speed of convergence of the real
exchange rate to its long-run equilibrium value. Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti
(2007) analyse the reallocation of endogenous product varieties to the most
productive country following a shock. They find that this reallocation can
be considerable, but only if the labour supply elasticity is so high that rela-
tive wages are not aﬀected by the shock. In contrast to these contributions,
I do not focus on a specific eﬀect or statistics, but instead I investigate the
impact of the labour supply elasticity on the second-order moments of sev-
eral variables. I consider both demand (money and government expenditure)
and supply-type (productivity) shocks, and I show that the consequences of
varying the labour supply elasticity are dependent on the pricing assumption.
As in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995), my model features monopolistic com-
petition and price rigidity. An important issue in this literature is the choice
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of currency of invoicing. This choice is important because in a two-country,
two-currency world it is possible to model price rigidity in diﬀerent ways. One
way, for example, is to assume that the law of one price holds and that prices
are sticky in the currency of the producer (producer currency pricing or PCP).
This assumption is made, among others, by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 2000,
2007), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Galí and Monacelli (2005), and Benigno
(2009). Another possibility is to assume that prices are sticky in the currency
of the destination market (local currency pricing or LCP). This assumption
is made, for example, by Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000), Kollmann (2001),
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), and
Sutherland (2005). To date, the choice of pricing assumption and the degree
of exchange rate pass-through into import prices are still open questions in the
literature. I follow the approach of Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and I allow the
pass-through elasticity to be either one or zero. This enables me to consider
both PCP and LCP as special cases of a single specification.
Since the Frisch elasticity of labour supply cannot be calibrated freely, I
compare the performance of the infinite elasticity model with an analogous
model in which individuals supply their labour services to both sectors at
the same time, and the labour supply elasticity is finite. I find that the
infinite labour supply elasticity dampens the response of wages and prices to
exogenous shocks. The higher is the labour supply elasticity, the smaller is
price adjustment, and the higher is the persistence of the series. However,
the consequences of varying the labour supply elasticity for the model-implied
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second-order moments depend on whether the pricing assumption is PCP or
LCP. The two variables that are most aﬀected by the labour supply elasticity
are net exports and the terms of trade. The infinite Frisch elasticity increases
the volatility of the terms of trade in the PCP scenario, but decreases it in the
LCP scenario. Moreover, a finite and relatively low labour supply elasticity is
important to generate countercyclical net exports as in the data, but this only
happens in the LCP case. The only consequence of the infinite labour supply
elasticity that is not dependent on the pricing assumption is the improved
persistence of net exports.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the model,
and Section 3 the alternative assumption that individuals supply labour con-
temporaneously to both sectors. The calibration of the model is described in
Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 explain the findings, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The model includes features such as Calvo-style price rigidity, nontradeable
goods and home bias in consumption. The elasticity of exchange rate pass-
through is a free parameter of the model, which nests both PCP and LCP as
special cases.
The world economy consists of two countries, Home and Foreign. Both
countries have two sectors, and in each sector there exists a continuum of
monopolistic firms, each of them producing a single diﬀerentiated product,
or brand. The notation is as follows. The firms and the goods they produce
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are indexed by fTH ∈ [0, 1] for the Home tradeable sector and fN ∈ [0, 1] for
the Home nontradeable sector. In the Foreign country, they are indexed by
f∗TF ∈ [0, 1] and f∗N ∈ [0, 1] respectively. All Foreign variables and indexes
are denoted with stars. Prices of individual varieties are denoted with lower
cases, aggregate prices with upper cases. Steady state variables have a zero
time index.
Firms
Each firm has a fixed probability of changing its prices at date t. All prices are
set in the currency of the buyer, thus tradeable goods firms in both countries
set two diﬀerent prices, one for the Home market and one for the Foreign
market, denominated in the respective local currencies. However, the degree
of exchange rate pass-through is not necessarily zero, since export prices can
adjust to changes in the nominal exchange rate.
More formally, I follow the approach of Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), and
assume that the local currency prices of exports of Home and Foreign tradeable
varieties fTH and f∗TF are given, respectively, by:
p∗TH,t (fTH) =
epTH,t (fTH)
eζt
, pTF,t (f∗TF ) = e
ζ
t ep∗TF,t (f∗TF ) , (1)
where e is the nominal exchange rate (price of the Home currency in terms of
the Foreign currency), ζ is the pass-through elasticity, constant by assumption,
and epTH (fTH) and ep∗TF (f∗TF ) are predetermined components that are not
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adjusted to variations in the exchange rate during period t. Thus, if ζ is equal
to one the exchange rate pass-through is complete, and if ζ is equal to zero
the pass-through is zero.
For example, a Home tradeable sector firm fTH chooses the price pTH,t (fTH)
of domestic sales, and the predetermined component epTH,t (fTH) of the export
price, by maximising the present discounted value of profits:
Et
∞X
j=0
(ϕβ)j Qt,t+j
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
pTH,t(fTH)
Pt+j
· yTH,t+j|t (fTH)
+et+j
p∗TH,t+j(fTH)
Pt+j
y∗TH,t+j|t (fTH)
−WTH,t+jPt+j · ehTH,t+j|t (fTH)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (2)
subject to:
yTH,t+j|t (fTH) =
µ
pTH,t (fTH)
PTH,t+j
¶−η
CTH,t+j ,
y∗TH,t+j|t (fTH) =
Ã
p∗TH,t+j|t (fTH)
P ∗TH,t+j
!−η
C∗TH,t+j ,
p∗TH,t+j|t (fTH) = epTH,t (fTH) e−ζt+j , (3)
where Qt,t+j =
u0(Ct+j)
u0(Ct) , and (ϕ)
j is the probability that pTH,t (fTH) andepTH,t (fTH) still apply at the future date t+ j. The variables yTH,t+j|t (fTH)
and y∗TH,t+j|t (fTH) denote the Home and Foreign demands for good fTH , andehTH,t+j|t (fTH) denotes the total labour input used by the firm, if the prices
decided at t still apply at date t+ j.
Output sold at Home and abroad is produced using a common plant or
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production function:
yTH,t (fTH) + y∗TH,t (fTH) = zTH,t · ehTH,t (fTH)α , (4)
where the parameter α allows for decreasing returns to labour, and zTH rep-
resents technology.
In the Foreign country, the production function and maximization prob-
lem of the tradeable sector firms f∗TF are the same as in the Home country.
All parameters are assumed to be the same in both countries and sectors.
The pricing behaviour and production functions of nontradeable sector firms
fN and f∗N are as described in this section, except for the fact that nontrade-
able firms serve only their own domestic market and do not engage in price
discrimination.
Consumption indexes
Preferences over tradeable and nontradeable goods in the Home country are
specified as follows:1
Ct =
h
(1− γ)
1
φ (CT,t)
φ−1
φ + γ
1
φ (CN,t)
φ−1
φ
i φ
φ−1
. (5)
The Home aggregator for tradeable goods consumption is:
CT,t =
h
(1− δ)
1
θ (CTH,t)
θ−1
θ + δ
1
θ (CTF,t)
θ−1
θ
i θ
θ−1 . (6)
1Preferences in the Foreign country are described by the same aggregators.
10
The consumption sub-indices for the individual varieties are CES aggre-
gators, with constant elasticity of substitution η. Price indexes are defined
as the minimal expenditures needed to buy one unit of the corresponding
consumption aggregators.
Government budget constraint and money supply
The Home and Foreign governments purchase only nontradeable goods pro-
duced in their own country. The budget constraint of the Home government
at date t is given by:2
Mt −Mt−1 = PN,tGt + TRt , (7)
where G is a CES aggregator of varieties fN , with the same elasticity of
substitution η.
Individual preferences and labour supply
The Home and Foreign countries are populated by a continuum of homoge-
neous individuals uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. I discuss only the Home
maximisation problem, since it is the same in both countries. In each pe-
riod the individual chooses consumption, real money balances MP and hours
worked in each sector. Let hTH and hN denote total hours supplied to all
firms in sectors TH and N . Total time available to an employed individual
is normalized to one, and total time available to an unemployed individual
2The Foreign government budget constraint and the public expenditure aggregator are
entirely analogous.
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is denoted with τ . An individual who works incurs a fixed participation or
commuting cost ψ. Because of the restriction that labour cannot be supplied
in both sectors simultaneously, the individual’s consumption possibilities set
X in any given period is nonconvex:
X =
½µ
C,
M
P
, hTH , hN
¶
: C ≥ 0, M
P
≥ 0, 0 ≤ hTH ≤ 1− ψ, 0 ≤ hN ≤ 1− ψ, hTH · hN = 0
¾
.
The individual’s utility function3 is:
U0 = E0
X∞
t=0
βt
"
C1−σt − 1
1− σ +
χ
1− ε
µ
Mt
Pt
¶1−ε
+ υ (hTH,t, hN,t)
#
, (8)
where:
υ (hTH,t, hN,t) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
κ
ω (1− ψ − hTH,t)
ω if hTH,t 6= 0 ,
κ
ω (1− ψ − hN,t)
ω if hN,t 6= 0 ,
κ
ω (τ)
ω if hTH,t = hN,t = 0 .
The consumption set can be convexified by adding lotteries over the choice
of working in the two sectors, and with complete markets the decentralized
3 I choose these functional forms because Rogerson’s (1988b) aggregation requires separa-
ble preferences, and because analogous functional forms (but not the nonconvexity) can be
found in the literature; for example, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) or Benigno and Thoenissen
(2003).
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equilibrium reproduces the socially optimal allocation.4 In this environment
the individual maximises her expected utility, which is given by:
U0 = E0
X∞
t=0
βt
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C1−σt −1
1−σ +
χ
1−ε
³
Mt
Pt
´1−ε
+ nTH,t · κω (1− ψ − hTH,t)ω
+nN,t · κω (1− ψ − hN,t)ω
+(1− nTH,t − nN,t) · κω (τ)ω
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
(9)
where nTH and nN are the probabilities of working in the tradeable and
nontradeable sectors. Because of the law of large numbers, these are equal to
the fractions of individuals at the aggregate level.
The aggregation based on employment lotteries has attracted some ob-
jections (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2011), but on the other hand the utility
function (9) possesses several advantages. First, it disentangles both margins
of labour supply, hours and participation rates. Second, since the probabilities
enter linearly, it can be interpreted as average or expected utility. Third, this
specification does not impose that sectors pay the same wage.
In order to examine the implications for the labour supply elasticity, it
is necessary to specify the budget constraint. Individuals trade in a one-
period non-contingent real bond, denominated in units of the Home tradeable
goods consumption index, sold at the price PT . Similarly to Benigno (2001),
individuals must pay a small cost in order to undertake a position in the
4Thus the allocations are the same as those chosen by a utilitarian household with a unit
mass of homogeneous individuals. The household assigns a fraction of its members to sector
TH and another fraction to sector N , pools its members’ labour incomes and ensures that
each one receives the same level of consumption.
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international asset market.5 This cost is assumed to be a payment in exchange
for intermediation services, oﬀered by financial firms located in both the Home
and the Foreign country. Individuals pay this cost only to firms located in
their own country.
The period-t budget constraint of the individual in the Home country is
as follows:
BtPT,t +
ν
C0
B2t PT,t +Mt ≤ (1 + rt−1)Bt−1PT,t +Mt−1
+TRt − PtCt + nTH,tWTH,thTH,t + nN,tWN,thN,t
+
Z 1
0
ΠTH,t (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN,t (fN) dfN +Rt , (10)
where B is the internationally traded bond, νC0B is the cost of holding one
unit of the bond, which depends on the positive parameter ν, r is the real
interest rate, TR are government transfers, WTH and WN are the wages paid
in the tradeable and nontradeable sector respectively, ΠTH (fTH) and ΠN (fN)
are the profits that the individual receives from firms fTH (tradeable sector)
and fN (nontradeable sector), and R represents the rents generated by the
financial intermediaries. The internationally traded bond B is in zero net
supply worldwide. Wages are flexible.
When both participation rates and hours of work are choice variables the
assumption that preferences are separable has important consequences. By
5This assumption ensures stationarity of the model and a well-defined steady state, as
demonstrated by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
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combining a few first order conditions of the maximization problem we obtain:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH,t)ω + κ (1− ψ − hTH,t)ω−1 hTH,t =
κ
ω
(τ)ω , (11)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN,t)ω + κ (1− ψ − hN,t)ω−1 hN,t =
κ
ω
(τ)ω . (12)
Equations (11) and (12) above must have a unique solution, but the solu-
tion must be the same in the steady state and in each date t. Therefore, in
this model hours worked in the two sectors are always constant and equal to
each other.6 This result in turn implies that the first order conditions with
respect to the labour eﬀort reduce to only one equation:
κ (1− ψ − h0)ω−1Cσt =
WTH,t
Pt
=
WN,t
Pt
, (13)
where h0 is endogenously constant. Notice that in Hansen’s (1985) model h0
is exogenously given instead. Wages are equalized between sectors, and in
this model output demand determines the amount of the labour input. The
aggregate labour supply,7 i.e. the supply of nt ≡ nTH,t + nN,t holding wealth
constant, is infinitely elastic, as is the supply of nTH,t and nN,t.
6 It is possible to ensure that hours worked in the two sectors are diﬀerent by specifying
a diﬀerent participation cost ψ in the two sectors.
7 In Appendix A.2 I investigate whether the infinite elasticity is due to the employment
lottery or the homogeneity of individuals. I show that heterogeneity per se does not guar-
antee a finite elasticity of labour supply, and what matters in a model with this type of
non-convexity is how the aggregate variables are derived from the preferences of heteroge-
neous individuals. In a social planner solution it is possible to have a finite labour supply
elasticity if individuals are heterogeneous. In a competitive equilibrium with employment
lotteries the elasticity of labour supply is infinite, even with agent heterogeneity.
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3 If labour is supplied in both sectors simultane-
ously
The standard assumption in the literature is that individuals can work con-
temporaneously in both the tradeable and nontradeable sectors. For compa-
rability purposes I keep the same functional forms in both scenarios. The
utility function and budget constraint are as follows:
U0 = E0
X∞
t=0
βt
"
C1−σt − 1
1− σ +
χ
1− ε
µ
Mt
Pt
¶1−ε
+
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH,t − hN,t)ω
#
,
(14)
BtPT,t +
ν
C0
B2t PT,t +Mt ≤ (1 + rt−1)Bt−1PT,t +Mt−1
+TRt − PtCt +Wt (hTH,t + hN,t)
+
Z 1
0
ΠTH,t (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN,t (fN) dfN +Rt . (15)
Since hours worked enter additively, the individual is indiﬀerent between
working in one sector or both, provided the aggregate labour supply ht ≡
hTH,t +hN,t is the same. Notice that in an interior solution sectors must pay
the same wage.
It may be possible to interpret (14) as the utility function of a stand-
in household, whose hours of work equal aggregate hours in the economy.
There are however some unresolved issues with this interpretation. The utility
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function (14) does not distinguish between the intensive and the extensive
margins of labour supply, however, if hTH,t and hN,t are to be interpreted as
aggregate hours, they must be the outcome of choices made on both margins.
If, for example, we regard the hours in (14) as the product of participation
rates times hours worked per person, then this specification is neither the
average nor the expected utility of the members of the household. More
generally, it is not possible to see how the intensive and extensive margins
determine the aggregate hours in (14) without a formal derivation of the utility
of the stand-in household from individual preferences.
To examine the implications of (14) for the labour supply elasticity, con-
sider the first order condition with respect to the labour eﬀort:
κ (1− ψ − ht)ω−1Cσt =
Wt
Pt
. (16)
The Frisch elasticity of the aggregate labour supply is 11−ω
1−ψ−ht
ht
. Given
h0, the choice of ω determines its steady state value. Therefore, the labour
supply (for a given level of wealth) is upward sloping.8 Firms decide how
aggregate hours worked are allocated between the two sectors.
4 Parameterization
The parameterization of the model is shown in Table 1.
8Once the Frisch elasticity is chosen, the actual values of κ and ψ are irrelevant to the
dynamics of the log-linearized model. Notice that if ω = 1 the elasticity of labour supply
becomes infinite.
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TABLE 1 HERE
The parameter σ is the same as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).
Given σ, I choose  so that the consumption elasticity of money demand is
equal to one, and I choose κ and ψ so that hours worked in the steady state
are equal to 324.8/1369.9
The elasticity of substitution between tradeable and nontradeable goods
is as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005). I choose a value for the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign tradeables that is somehow in the
middle of the range of values in the literature. The preference weight for
nontradeables γ is set between the values suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2007) and Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), and the parametrization of δ,
the preference weight for Foreign-produced tradeables, is as in Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2004). I calibrate the steady state ratios of exogenous technology so
that the ratio of Home to Foreign tradeable output is equal to one, and the
Home and Foreign ratios of tradeable to nontradeable output10 are equal to
0.2.
The intermediation cost parameter ν is chosen so that the spread in the
nominal interest rates approximates the value suggested by Benigno (2009).
The parameter η implies that the steady state markup is about 1.15, and the
probabilities of not changing prices imply an average price duration of about
9These numbers are average hours worked in a year and total hours available, taken from
Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996).
10The ratio of value added in manufacturing over the value added in services is approxi-
mately equal to 0.2 in the US. Source: own calculations based on the Groningen 60-Industry
Database, http://www.ggdc.net.
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one year. The elasticity of output with respect to hours is calibrated so that,
given the mark-up, in the steady state the share of wages in output is equal
to 0.7.
The growth rates of technology, the money growth rates and government
expenditures are all assumed to be exogenously given by AR(1) processes,
with zero unconditional means (except for the technology processes). The
calibrated parameters of the exogenous processes are taken from Chari, Ke-
hoe and McGrattan (2002) and Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008), and are
the same for both countries. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) calibrate
the variance of the monetary shocks so that their model reproduces the stan-
dard deviation of US GDP. This method gives a diﬀerent calibrated value in
each specification of the model. Since I want to keep the volatility of the
money shocks constant in all specifications, I proceed as follows. I compute
the standard deviation of the monetary shocks so as to match the standard
deviation of US GDP (given all the other parameters in Table 1), under four
diﬀerent scenarios: finite and infinite elasticity, LCP and PCP. I then set the
standard deviation of the monetary shocks equal to the average of these four
values.
I solve the model numerically using Uhlig’s “Toolkit” algorithm (1999).
The numerical solution is obtained by log-linearising the equations around a
deterministic equilibrium or steady state. I assume that in the steady state
bond holdings are zero.
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5 Results
I illustrate the performance of the model of Section (2) against the data and
against the standard assumption that individuals supply labour contempo-
raneously to both sectors, in which case I assume that preferences are as in
Section (3) and so the labour supply elasticity is finite. I consider two alterna-
tive values for the Frisch elasticity11, 1.5 and 0.75, and I report second-order
moments of the finite and the infinite elasticity models in Tables 2 and 3. I
consider both pricing assumptions, LCP and PCP.
TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE
An important issue to consider beforehand is the measurement of the ag-
gregate labour input. In the model of Section (2), all variation in the labour
input is due to variation in the extensive margin, or changes in participation
rates, so I measure the aggregate labour input with nt. On the other hand, if
individuals supply labour contemporaneously to both sectors and preferences
are as in Section (3), all variation in the labour input is due variation in the
intensive margin, or changes in hours, so the aggregate labour input is ht.
I choose to measure the aggregate labour input in the data with aggregate
hours, which are the product of average weekly hours and employment, and
11These are steady state values. I choose these two values because most estimates in the
macro literature lie in this range. Raﬀo (2008) reports that the range of estimates for the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply is between 1 and 1.5 at the aggregate level. Based on their
survey of the literature, Chetty et al. (2011) recommend calibrating macro models to match
a Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours of 0.75.
On the other hand, some authors in the literature assume that the disutility from labour
is linear, so the Frisch labour supply elasticity is infinite (for example, Cooke 2010).
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therefore reflect changes along both margins.12
The other variables of interest are real aggregate output, which is defined
as Yt ≡ PTH,0YTH,t + P ∗TH,0Y ∗TH,t + PN,0YN,t, while total tradeable output is
Y TotTH,t ≡ YTH,t+Y ∗TH,t = CTH,t+C∗TH,t. The real exchange rate is the ratio of
Foreign to Home aggregate price indexes RERt ≡ (etP ∗t ) /Pt, and the (Home)
terms of trade is the relative price of imports over exports:
Tt ≡
PTF,t
etP ∗TH,t
(17)
Finally, net exports are measured as the ratio of real net exports to real
GDP, NXt ≡
³
P ∗TH,0Y
∗
TH,t − PTF,0YTF,t
´
/Yt.
As it is possible to see from Tables 2 and 3, the finite and the infinite elas-
ticity models do not generate the same statistics, therefore the labour sup-
ply elasticity aﬀects the performance of open economy models, particularly
along some dimensions. Net exports are one of the variables most aﬀected
by this elasticity. A high Frisch elasticity causes the volatility of net exports
to increase, but this happens only under PCP. Under LCP, net exports are
countercyclical if the Frisch elasticity is low, but the eﬀect of the elasticity
on the co-movement between net exports and output disappears under PCP.
Countercyclical net exports are an important feature of the data, and the
literature has found that the ability to reproduce a negative correlation be-
tween net exports and output crucially depends on the utility function (Raﬀo
12This choice is consistent with many studies, including the indivisible labour literature.
For example, Hansen (1985) considers total hours (i.e. aggregate) for persons at work in
non-agricultural industries. However, other studies measure ht with employment data (for
example, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 2002).
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2008, Janko 2011). In particular, preferences à la Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Huﬀman (1988) are considered superior in this respect. However, Table 2 sug-
gests that the pricing assumption is another important consideration, and that
other preferences, such as separable utility, can also generate countercyclical
net exports under LCP.
The other variable most aﬀected by the labour supply elasticity is the terms
of trade. A high Frisch elasticity increases the volatility of the terms of trade
in the PCP scenario, but decreases it in the LCP scenario. Moreover, under
PCP a high Frisch elasticity improves the persistence of the terms of trade,
but there is no improvement under LCP. Overall, the consequences of the
labour supply elasticity for the model-implied second-order moments depend
on whether the pricing assumption is PCP or LCP. The only consequence of
the infinite labour supply elasticity that is robust to the pricing assumption
is the improved persistence of net exports.
On the other hand, there are some facts that are common to both the finite
and the infinite elasticity models. Under both PCP and LCP, the standard
deviations of consumption, output, employment and the nominal exchange
rate are fairly close to the data. The cross-correlations of consumption and
hours with output are also fairly close to the data. However, both the finite
and the infinite elasticity models do not match the data along several dimen-
sions. They do not generate enough volatility in the real exchange rate and
generate too much volatility in the terms of trade. The standard deviation
of net exports is well above or well below the data, in the PCP and LCP
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scenarios, respectively. They generate cross-correlations of the terms of trade,
real and nominal exchange rate that are well away from the data. Finally, the
model-generated series are not as persistent as the data.
Given the focus of this paper on the tradeable and nontradeable sectors,
I also report sectoral statistics in Tables 2 and 3. In the data, the tradeable
sector is represented by manufacturing, and the nontradeable sector by the
service sector.13 Under both LCP and PCP, the sectoral statistics generated
by the infinite elasticity model are similar to the ones obtained with a finite
Frisch elasticity. However, only in the PCP scenario the infinite and the finite
elasticity models are able to generate more volatile employment and output
in the tradeable sector than in the nontradeable sector.14
Naturally, we can ask why the finite and the infinite elasticity models do
not generate exactly the same statistics. What consequences can be expected
by varying the Frisch elasticity in open economy models? I will answer this
question in the paragraphs that follow. I will explain first why the slope of the
labour supply matters for the transmission of shocks, and in the next Section
I will focus on the individual variables.
13The sectoral statistics presented in Tables 2 and 3 diﬀer from the ones in Devereux and
Hnatkovska (2012). This is because they report the properties of sectoral shares, while I
compute the statistics using sectoral output levels.
14Notice that, since some manufacturing output is nontradeable, and some services are
actually traded internationally, the data is an imprecise measure of the theoretical tradeable
and nontradeable output levels. To some extent, this is true for all sectoral classifications of
the data. Therefore, it is more sensible to investigate the ability of the model to reproduce
the same qualitative pattern as in the data (higher volatilities in the tradeable sector), rather
than its ability to replicate the data moments quantitatively. I discuss this measurement
error in Povoledo (2013).
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The Frisch elasticity is the elasticity of the labour supply curve, holding
wealth constant. Therefore, the larger is this elasticity and the more pro-
nounced is the response of employment after a shock. This fact is confirmed
by Tables 2 and 3: both sectoral and aggregate employment are more volatile
when the Frisch elasticity is higher. But notice that the larger is the Frisch
elasticity and the flatter is the labour supply curve, so not only the response
of employment is magnified, but also the response of wages is reduced. Since
wages aﬀect marginal costs, the lower is the response of wages, the lower is
the response of prices after a shock, because firms optimally choose not to
raise their prices much if wages do not rise much. Therefore, the higher is the
Frisch elasticity, the less responsive are prices.
Since the Frisch elasticity controls the responses of prices after a shock,
it fundamentally aﬀects the response of output, at the sectoral as well as the
aggregate level. To understand how output is aﬀected by the Frisch elasticity,
it is essential to distinguish between supply-type and demand-type shocks.15
After a positive demand-type shock, such as a positive monetary or govern-
ment expenditure shock, labour demand increases, putting upward pressure
on wages and prices. But the smallest is the increase in prices, the bigger is
the eﬀect of the demand shock on output. Therefore, a comparatively high
Frisch elasticity amplifies the eﬀect of demand-type shocks on output. On
the other hand, after a positive supply-type shock, such as a positive tech-
nology shock, labour demand falls, putting downward pressure on wages and
15 In explaining how output is aﬀected by the Frisch elasticity, for simplicity I only consider
shocks originating in the same country and sector.
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therefore prices. The strongest is the fall in prices, the bigger is the eﬀect of
the supply-type shock on output. Therefore, a relatively high Frisch elasticity
reduces the eﬀect of supply-type shocks on output. In conclusion, the impact
of the Frisch elasticity on output volatility depends on which shocks are the
main source of business cycle fluctuations. Tables 2 and 3 show that the infi-
nite Frisch elasticity causes output to become more volatile: this fact suggests
that in the model demand-type shocks are the main cause of business cycles.
This intuition is confirmed by a formal variance decomposition exercise that
I present in Section 6.
The Frisch elasticity of labour supply also aﬀects the persistence of the
model-generated series. Except for the persistence of the shocks, the only
other mechanism ensuring persistence is the Calvo price stickiness. If prices
were fully flexible the adjustment towards the steady state would be very
rapid. As explained above, if the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is relatively
high, wages, and therefore marginal costs, do not change much after a shock.
As a result, the firms that are allowed to change their price after a shock will
optimally choose a small adjustment, and ultimately a small price adjustment
gives persistence. Tables 2 and 3 confirm this explanation.16
Moreover, since the Frisch elasticity of labour supply aﬀects the persis-
tence, it can also aﬀect the cross correlations between variables. For example,
consider any two variables which move together in the same direction, after
any shock and at all horizons. If the Frisch elasticity is relatively high, as
16The only exception is the autocorrelation of the terms of trade, which actually goes
down if the Frisch elasticity increases.
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explained above the adjustment towards the steady state is slower, so the two
variables in this example will stay positively correlated at longer horizons. As
a result, their correlation coeﬃcient will increase. Of course, not all variables
move in the same direction at all horizons and after all shocks. This example
merely serves to illustrate why the Frisch elasticity matters for some cross
correlation coeﬃcients, as shown by Tables 2 and 3, but its impact on any
given coeﬃcient cannot be generalised, instead, it must be investigated on a
case-by-case basis.
6 Discussion
To further understand the results of Tables 2 and 3 it is important to ascertain
which shocks are the main sources of business cycle fluctuations, and how the
macroeconomic variables respond to them. The former task can be achieved
by performing a variance decomposition exercise, and the latter by inspecting
the impulse responses.
TABLE 4 HERE
The variance decompositions of the model of Section (2) are shown in
Table 4. For most variables, Home and Foreign money shocks are the main
cause of fluctuations, but the impact of technology and government expendi-
ture shocks on aggregate and sectoral employment and output is significant.
Since nontradeables make up the largest component of aggregate output, a
large proportion of the variance of aggregate output is explained by govern-
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ment expenditure on nontradeable goods. However, the sum of Home and
Foreign money shocks always explains the largest share of the variance of
most variables, even of those that are significantly aﬀected by technology and
government expenditure shocks. Therefore, for the sake of concision, I only
present the responses to Home money shocks under both PCP and LCP.17
FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 shows the responses of consumption, the terms of trade and the
real and nominal exchange rates. A positive Home monetary shock causes a
nominal depreciation of the Home currency, which is more pronounced in the
LCP scenario. Because of price rigidity, the nominal depreciation is accom-
panied by a real depreciation. Under PCP, the exchange rate pass-through
into import prices is full, so the currency depreciation causes an increase in
Home import prices plus a fall in export prices, and as a result the terms
of trade increases. On the other hand, under LCP there is no exchange rate
pass-through, thus the nominal depreciation causes the terms of trade to fall.18
As noted in Section 5, the finite and the infinite elasticity models have
very diﬀerent implications for the volatility of the terms of trade. I will now
provide an explanation of this fact, focusing on monetary shocks only as these
explain almost 90% of the variance of the terms of trade. Consider LCP first.
After a positive Home monetary shock, the nominal depreciation raises the
17The responses to Foreign shocks are symmetric because the parameterization is the same
for the Home and Foreign economies. The responses to all the other shocks are available on
request.
18See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) for an analysis of the implications of the PCP and LCP
assumptions for the terms of trade.
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denominator of Equation 17. Home prices also increase, so the denominator
of Equation 17 increases also because of the increase in the predetermined
component of export prices. As explained in Section 5, the response of prices
depends on the Frisch elasticity. The lower is the Frisch elasticity, the larger
is the increase in the predetermined component of export prices, so the more
pronounced is the fall in the terms of trade immediately after the positive
Home monetary shock. Therefore, under LCP the terms of trade is more
volatile if the Frisch elasticity is relatively low. This fact is confirmed by
Table 2.
Next, consider a positive Home monetary shock under PCP. In this case,
a nominal depreciation does not aﬀect the denominator of Equation 17, in-
stead it raises the numerator proportionally.19 But because the predetermined
component of export prices always aﬀects the denominator, the rise in Home
prices now dampens the terms of trade increase, so a lower Frisch elasticity
lessens the responsiveness of the terms of trade to monetary shocks. As a
result, under PCP the terms of trade is less volatile if the Frisch elasticity is
relatively low, which is confirmed by Table 3.
FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE
The responses of aggregate employment, aggregate output and net ex-
ports, which are shown in Figure 2, are also aﬀected by the pricing assump-
tion. Under PCP, Home employment, output and net exports all benefit
from expenditure-switching (the shift of foreign and domestic demand towards
19Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), p. 120.
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Home tradeable goods). Because of expenditure-switching, the higher is the
volatility of the terms of trade, and the higher is the volatility of net exports.
On the other hand, under LCP nominal exchange rate movements are not
passed onto international prices, so there is no expenditure-switching.20 As
a result, after a positive Home monetary shock, output and employment in-
crease considerably less and net exports become negative instead. Therefore,
the absence of expenditure-switching is crucial for net exports to be counter-
cyclical, as in the data. However, notice that, at longer horizons, the responses
of net exports and output have the same sign. So the slower is the adjustment
towards the steady state, the less negative is the correlation. Hence, in order
to ensure that the correlation between net exports and output stays negative
under LCP, we could select a comparatively low Frisch elasticity (see Table 2)
because it helps to speed up the adjustment towards the steady state.
7 Conclusion
The challenge of building macroeconomic models that are consistent with
the microeconometric evidence has generated renewed interest on indivisible
labour. However, indivisible labour is only one type of nonconvexity aﬀecting
the labour supply. In models with sectors, such as many international macro
models, a nonconvexity arises whenever individuals cannot work in two or
more sectors at the same time.
20The impact of expenditure-switching under PCP can be deduced from Figure 3. The
immediate increase in tradeable sector output and labour input is almost three times as
large in the PCP case than in the LCP case.
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It is fair to say that open economy macroeconomics has not been aﬀected
yet by the debate on the microfoundations of aggregate labour supply. Perhaps
the explanation is that a model with two countries and two sectors is inherently
larger than the closed economy, one sector models typically analysed in the
existing literature on nonconvexities in labour supply. Analytical tractability
is understandably a deciding factor.
This paper shows that it is possible to deal with the restriction that in-
dividuals cannot contemporaneously work in two sectors at the same time
without sacrificing analytical tractability. To simplify aggregation I use lot-
teries with complete markets. One drawback of this approach is that the
elasticity of labour supply becomes infinite. However, I show that the inabil-
ity to calibrate this elasticity to any finite value of choice does not compromise
the performance of the model, since what matters more in models of this type
is ultimately the choice of pricing assumption. The only eﬀect of the infi-
nite elasticity that is robust to the pricing assumption is the increase in the
persistence of net exports, although it is not enough to match the data.
One advantage of this approach is that the utility function features both
the intensive (hours) and the extensive (participation rates) margins of labour
supply. Since individuals cannot work in two sectors at the same time, ex-
ogenous shocks trigger a reallocation of workers between sectors, which may
be a costly or lengthy process. Therefore, it may be interesting to extend the
model by considering such costs or delays, and to analyse how the transmis-
sion of shocks or the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect are aﬀected by them. I leave
30
these issues for future research.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Utility β = 0.99, σ = ε = 5, h0 = 0.24
Consumption indexes φ = 1, θ = 1, γ = 0.70, δ = 0.30
Asset market ν = 0.005
Firms ϕ = 0.75, η = 7.88, α = 0.8
ζ = 0 (LCP) or ζ = 1 (PCP)
Exogenous processes: bxj,t = xj + ρj · bxj,t−1 + j
Money growth ρ = 0.68, var() = var(∗) = (0.0151)2, corr(, ∗) = 0.50
Tradeable technology ρ = 0.95, var() = var(∗) = (0.007)2, corr(, ∗) = 0.25
Nontradeable technology ρ = 0.95, var() = var(∗) = (0.007)2, corr(, ∗) = 0.25
Government expenditure: ρ = 0.97, var() = var(∗) = (0.01)2, corr(, ∗) = 0
Table 2: Business cycle statistics under LCP
Standard deviations C Y n NX T RER e
US data 0.97 1.26 1.78 0.36 2.23 6.12 6.01
Infinite elasticity 1.08 1.17 1.64 0.07 3.78 4.55 5.86
Frisch = 1.5 1.05 1.11 1.56 0.06 3.91 4.49 5.84
Frisch = 0.75 1.03 1.08 1.49 0.07 3.94 4.42 5.82
Autocorrelations C Y n NX T RER e
US data 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.82
Infinite elasticity 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.57 0.65 0.72
Frisch = 1.5 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.59 0.65 0.72
Frisch = 0.75 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.55 0.59 0.64 0.72
Cross-correlations C,Y Y, Y n, Y NX, Y T, Y RER,Y e, Y
US data 0.81 1.00 0.80 -0.39 0.09 0.11 0.09
Infinite elasticity 0.91 1.00 0.85 -0.03 -0.40 0.43 0.39
Frisch = 1.5 0.91 1.00 0.83 -0.23 -0.41 0.42 0.37
Frisch = 0.75 0.90 1.00 0.82 -0.26 -0.41 0.41 0.36
Sectoral standard deviations
& cross-correlations Y TotTH YN nTH nN Y
Tot
TH , Y YN , Y nTH , Y nN , Y
US data 2.50 0.50 1.98 0.89 0.90 0.49 0.82 0.74
Infinite elasticity 1.03 1.32 1.55 1.90 0.84 0.98 0.68 0.81
Frisch = 1.5 0.99 1.27 1.50 1.82 0.82 0.98 0.65 0.79
Frisch = 0.75 0.97 1.23 1.46 1.76 0.81 0.98 0.62 0.77
NOTE: The data moments have been computed using quarterly series for the period 1980:1 to 2007:4. Data sources and
calculations are explained in the Appendix. All moments have been computed from logged and H-P-filtered series, except
net exports, which are HP-filtered but not logged.
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Table 3: Business cycle statistics under PCP
Standard deviations C Y n NX T RER e
US data 0.97 1.26 1.78 0.36 2.23 6.12 6.01
Infinite elasticity 1.04 1.54 2.07 0.69 4.68 3.87 5.86
Frisch = 1.5 1.03 1.42 1.90 0.55 3.18 3.95 5.85
Frisch = 0.75 1.00 1.37 1.82 0.53 3.10 3.80 5.83
Autocorrelations C Y n NX T RER e
US data 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.82
Infinite elasticity 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.73
Frisch = 1.5 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.51 0.67 0.73
Frisch = 0.75 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.57 0.50 0.66 0.73
Cross-correlations C,Y Y, Y n, Y NX, Y T, Y RER,Y e, Y
US data 0.81 1.00 0.80 -0.39 0.09 0.11 0.09
Infinite elasticity 0.86 1.00 0.91 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.64
Frisch = 1.5 0.88 1.00 0.89 0.69 0.66 0.69 0.58
Frisch = 0.75 0.87 1.00 0.88 0.69 0.66 0.69 0.57
Sectoral standard deviations
& cross-correlations Y TotTH YN nTH nN Y
Tot
TH , Y YN , Y nTH , Y nN , Y
US data 2.50 0.50 1.98 0.89 0.90 0.49 0.82 0.74
Infinite elasticity 2.00 1.45 2.65 2.04 0.92 0.97 0.86 0.83
Frisch = 1.5 1.88 1.33 2.49 1.89 0.91 0.97 0.84 0.80
Frisch = 0.75 1.82 1.29 2.41 1.83 0.90 0.97 0.83 0.79
NOTE: See Table 2.
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Table 4: Variance decompositions
Variables: C Y n NX T RER e Y TotTH YN nTH nN
Shocks: LCP
H money growth 82.93 45.11 32.71 37.85 43.40 48.77 49.99 28.29 34.91 31.09 27.78
F money growth 13.00 8.85 6.42 37.85 43.40 48.77 49.99 20.87 3.96 22.94 3.15
H tradeable technology 0.33 0.97 3.37 8.40 5.01 0.03 0.00 35.50 0.97 28.23 0.77
F tradeable technology 0.09 0.14 0.42 8.40 5.01 0.03 0.00 0.65 0.25 1.60 0.20
H nontradeable technology 3.41 1.72 25.01 3.52 1.48 1.15 0.01 13.07 7.22 14.36 25.71
F nontradeable technology 0.08 0.16 0.85 3.52 1.48 1.15 0.01 0.92 0.36 1.01 0.76
H government expenditure 0.16 43.05 31.22 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.68 52.31 0.75 41.62
F government expenditure 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00
PCP
H money growth 80.32 62.11 49.08 47.78 45.24 48.40 49.99 64.86 40.66 67.86 32.92
F money growth 15.40 5.38 4.25 47.78 45.24 48.40 49.99 10.62 3.21 11.11 2.60
H tradeable technology 0.35 0.68 2.59 1.52 3.62 0.04 0.00 17.15 0.89 12.90 0.72
F tradeable technology 0.09 0.10 0.33 1.52 3.62 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.23 0.75 0.19
H nontradeable technology 3.58 1.24 19.09 0.66 1.05 1.49 0.01 6.25 6.65 6.54 23.97
F nontradeable technology 0.09 0.12 0.67 0.66 1.05 1.49 0.01 0.47 0.33 0.49 0.72
H government expenditure 0.17 30.36 23.99 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.33 48.03 0.34 38.89
F government expenditure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
NOTE: Shocks are orthogonalised using the Cholesky method, and the horizon is set at 200 quarters. Each column
reports, for each variable, the share of the total variance explained by every shock, measured in per cent. The
numbers are averages across all possible variance decompositions, given by the number of diﬀerent orderings of the
8 shocks (40,320).
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of consumption, terms of trade and real and nominal exchange rates to a 1% Home monetary shock. 
Infinite Frisch elasticity (top) and Frisch = 0.75 (bottom). 
 
 
Note: Time is in quarters.  
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of output, net exports and the labour input to a 1% Home monetary shock. Infinite Frisch elasticity (top) 
and Frisch = 0.75 (bottom). 
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of sectoral output and labour inputs to a 1% Home monetary shock. Infinite Frisch elasticity (top) and 
Frisch = 0.75 (bottom). 
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Appendices
A.1 Data sources and calculations
Alias Description Sourcea
Exports of goods and services; Imports of goods and services OECD QNA
(chained volume estimates)
Exports deflator; Imports deflator OECD QNA
Dollar exchange rates IMF IFS
C Private final consumption expenditure OECD QNA
Y Gross Domestic Product OECD QNA
n Aggregate weekly hours index, total private industries FRED
(quarterly averages of monthly data)
NX Exports - Imports of goods and services /GDP
T Exports deflator / Imports deflator
e Geometric GDP-weighted average of France, Germany, Canada, Japan,
Mexico and UK dollar exchange rates
P Consumer Price Index for all items OECD MEI
P ∗ Geometric GDP-weighted average of Canada, France, Germany,
Japan, Mexico and UK CPI indexes
RER = eP ∗/P
Y TotTH Index of production in total manufacturing OECD MEI
YN Index of real Gross Domestic Product of services BEA NIPA
nTH Employees in manufacturing OECD MEI
nN Employees of service-providing industries BLS
(quarterly averages of monthly data)
a Legend: BEA NIPA = Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts;
BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics; FRED = Federal Reserve Economic Data;
IMF IFS = IMF International Financial Statistics; OECD MEI = OECD Main Economic Indicators;
OECD QNA = OECD Quarterly National Accounts.
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A.2 Nonconvexity and individual heterogeneity
In this Appendix I analyse the relationship between the nonconvexity of the
individual commodity set and the labour supply elasticity. Do employment
lotteries always result in an infinite labour supply elasticity? Or is the infinite
elasticity due to the homogeneity of individuals’ preferences? I will answer
these questions first in the context of the indivisible labour model (i.e. when
individuals are not able to adjust the number of hours worked), since the
literature to date has focused on this type of nonconvexity. Then I will turn
to the model presented in this paper, in which I assume that individuals can
adjust the number of hours worked, but their commodity set is nonconvex
because they cannot work in two sectors at the same time.
Some authors have shown that indivisible labour is not by itself a suﬃcient
condition for the aggregate labour supply to have infinite elasticity. This point
is made, for example, by Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010), and is
based on a model where individuals diﬀer in their preference for leisure (or
aversion to work). By assumption the economy is populated by a continuum
of individuals, indexed with i ∈ [0, 1]. The utility of individual i is given by:
log (Ct)− iν , ν > 0 , (1)
if employed, and by:
log (Ct) , (2)
2
if unemployed.
Individuals are ranked according to their degree of aversion to work. Those
with high i have a strong aversion to work, and those with low i have a low
aversion to work. If nt is employment, then those with 0 ≤ i ≤ nt work and
those with i > nt do not. Individuals either work some fixed workweek or not
at all.1 Everyone receives the same level of consumption. Aggregate utility is
given by:
Z 1
0
log (Ct) di−
Z nt
0
iν di = log (Ct)−
nν+1t
ν + 1
. (3)
According to (3) the aggregate labour supply elasticity is equal to 1/ν,
hence it is possible to have a finite labour supply elasticity in an indivisible
labour environment if individuals are heterogeneous. Moreover any finite ag-
gregate labour supply elasticity can be calibrated by making an assumption
on the cross-sectional distribution of skills or taste parameters.
However, Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin’s (2010) result depends on a
particular aggregation method, one which assumes that individuals are ranked
according to their aversion to work, so that only those with low aversion go to
work, while others never go to work (as long as nt < 1). One must find a justi-
fication for why individuals would spontaneously choose such arrangement, or
alternatively, one could justify the aggregation of preferences (3) by means of
a social planner.2 Equation (3) is the social planner’s objective function, and
1This assumption justifies why the amount of time spent at work does not aﬀect the
preference ordering.
2Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010) assume instead a benevolent household, which
behaves as a de facto social planner.
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the welfare-maximising equilibrium is the one in which only those individuals
with a low aversion to work are employed.3
Aggregate outcomes are diﬀerent in a competitive equilibrium with lotter-
ies. In this set-up nt (i) is the probability of being employed, and consistently
with expected utility theory it enters the utility of individual i linearly:
log [Ct (i)]− nt (i) · iν . (4)
The individual i’s choice of employment lottery must satisfy the following
first-order condition:
1
Ct (i)
Wt
Pt
= iν , (5)
where Pt is the aggregate price index, and Wt is the market price of labour,
assumed to be the same for all individuals.4 Let the aggregate labour supply
be defined as:
nt ≡
Z 1
0
nt (i) di . (6)
Notice that (5) and (6) imply that the aggregate labour supply elasticity
is infinite. Therefore, heterogeneity per se does not guarantee a finite elastic-
ity of labour supply, and much depends on how the aggregate variables are
3The social planner solution also emerges in an economy where the individuals commit to
a risk-sharing arrangement. This solution concept is applied by Janko (2011), who assumes
non-separability in consumption and leisure and homogeneous preferences.
4This assumption helps to simplify the analysis but is not crucial.
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derived from the preferences of heterogeneous individuals. In a competitive
equilibrium with indivisible labour and employment lotteries the elasticity of
labour supply is infinite, even with agent heterogeneity.
On a side note, notice that this result depends on the assumption that
individuals know their type i when they solve the maximisation problem, and
the alternative assumption that individuals do not know their type would
bring about a totally diﬀerent result. In such alternative scenario, equation
(5) would hold in expectation and everyone would choose the same Ct (i) and
nt (i). Ex-post, after types are revealed, an individual who is allowed to re-
optimise while keeping the same Ct (i) would choose nt (i) = 0. Again in this
scenario individuals would not choose an equilibrium in which only those with
low i work.
I now turn to the model of Section 2 to further investigate the relationship
between nonconvexity and the labour supply elasticity. Here nonconvexity
arises because individuals cannot work in two sectors at the same time. I
modify the utility function by assuming that individuals are heterogeneous
in their preference for leisure, in a way similar to Christiano, Trabandt and
Walentin (2010), but I keep the same functional form as in Section 2. For
the sake of simplicity, I consider a one-period economy with no money and no
bonds, but all the other assumptions remain unchanged.
The Home country is populated by a continuum of individuals i ∈ (0, 1]
who diﬀer in regard to their preference for leisure. The utility function of
individual i is given by:
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C1−σ − 1
1− σ + υ (hTH , hN , i) , (7)
υ (hTH , hN , i) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
κ
ω (1− ψ − hTH)
ω iν if hTH 6= 0 ,
κ
ω (1− ψ − hN )
ω iν if hN 6= 0 ,
κ
ω (τ)
ω iν if hTH = hN = 0 ,
with ω, ν > 0.
Social planner problem
A social planner assigns a measure nTH of individuals to the tradeable goods
sector and a measure nN to the nontradeable goods sector. Those employed
in the tradeable goods sector supply hTH hours and those employed in the
nontradeable goods sector supply hN hours of work. All individuals working
in a sector work the same hours, however both hTH and hN are choice vari-
ables. As in Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010) (and the literature on
nonconvexity in labour supply) I assume that the social planner gives everyone
the same level of consumption.5 I assume that profits from monopolistically
competitive firms are distributed equally.
The utilitarian planner allocates the individuals with the lowest i to the
sector with the longer workweek. For example, if τ ≥ 1−ψ−hN ≥ 1−ψ−hTH
then the social planner’s objective is to maximise:
5Thus the allocation of consumption is the same as in the competitive equilibrium with
lotteries which I will discuss later.
6
max
C1−σ − 1
1− σ +
Z nTH
0
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH)ω iν di
+
Z nTH+nN
nTH
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN)ω iν di+
Z 1
nTH+nN
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν di , (8)
subject to:
PC ≤ nTHWTHhTH + nNWNhN +
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN ) dfN .
(9)
The first-order conditions with respect to hours and participation rates
are:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH)ω nνTH +
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN )ω (nTH + nN)ν
−κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN )ω nνTH −
κ
ω
(τ)ω (nTH + nN)
ν = −C
−σ
P
WTHhTH , (10)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN)ω (nTH + nN)ν−
κ
ω
(τ)ω (nTH + nN )
ν = −C
−σ
P
WNhN , (11)
κ (1− ψ − hTH)ω−1
(nTH)
ν+1
ν + 1
= −C
−σ
P
nTHWTH , (12)
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κ (1− ψ − hN )ω−1
"
(nTH + nN )
ν+1
ν + 1
− (nTH)
ν+1
ν + 1
#
= −C
−σ
P
nNWN . (13)
Equations (10) to (13) show that in the social planner solution participa-
tion rates do not enter linearly the first-order conditions. Hence, it is possible
to have a finite labour supply elasticity in the model if individuals are hetero-
geneous. The parameter ν can be used to calibrate the labour supply elasticity
in a given parameterization.
Competitive equilibrium with lotteries and insurance market
An individual chooses a probability nTH (i) of working in the tradeable sector
and a probability nN (i) of working in the nontradeable sector. A lottery is
held to determine which individuals must work and in which sector. Individ-
uals are paid only for the work that they actually do, but have access to an
insurance market. Because there are two sources of income risk, the risk of be-
ing unemployed and the risk of being allocated to the sector paying the lowest
wage, one insurance contract is not enough to attain full insurance. There-
fore I assume that individuals buy two policies with two separate insurance
firms. Under policy 1 a premium is due if employed in sector TH, and under
policy 2 a premium is due if employed in sector N . Both policies pay out a
compensation in case of unemployment. I now show that this arrangement is
suﬃcient to deliver full insurance.
The individual i chooses the compensation levels y1 (i) and y2 (i) by solving
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the following problem:
max nTH (i)
"
(C (i|TH))1−σ − 1
1− σ +
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH (i))ω iν
#
+nN (i)
"
(C (i|N))1−σ − 1
1− σ +
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN (i))ω iν
#
+(1− nTH (i)− nN (i))
"
(C (i|U))1−σ − 1
1− σ +
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν
#
, (14)
subject to:
PC (i|TH) ≤WTHhTH (i)+
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH+
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN) dfN−p1 (i) y1 (i) ,
(15)
PC (i|N) ≤WNhN (i)+
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH+
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN) dfN−p2 (i) y2 (i) ,
(16)
PC (i|U) ≤
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN) dfN + y1 (i) + y2 (i) , (17)
where C (i|TH), C (i|N) and C (i|U) are consumption of individual i contin-
gent on working in sectors TH, N or being unemployed, and p1 (i) and p2 (i)
are the two insurance prices.
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The first-order conditions with respect to y1 (i) and y2 (i) are:
nTH (i) (C (i|TH))−σ p1 (i) = (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) (C (i|U))−σ , (18)
nN (i) (C (i|N))−σ p2 (i) = (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) (C (i|U))−σ . (19)
Expected profits of both insurance firms are zero:
nTH (i) p1 (i) y1 (i)− (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) y1 (i) = 0 , (20)
nN (i) p2 (i) y2 (i)− (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) y2 (i) = 0 , (21)
therefore:
p1 (i) =
1− nTH (i)− nN (i)
nTH (i)
, (22)
p2 (i) =
1− nTH (i)− nN (i)
nN (i)
. (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) into the first-order conditions (18) and (19) we
obtain:
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nTH (i) (C (i|TH))−σ 1− nTH (i)− nN (i)nTH (i) = (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) (C (i|U))
−σ ,
(24)
nN (i) (C (i|N))−σ 1− nTH (i)− nN (i)nN (i) = (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) (C (i|U))
−σ ,
(25)
which show that C (i|TH) = C (i|N) = C (i|U). Therefore, the individual
insures herself fully against income risk. Consumption of individual i, denoted
by C (i) from now on, is independent of the employment status. Moreover,
since the left-hand sides of the constraints (15), (16) and (17) are identical,
y1 (i) and y2 (i) are chosen so that the right-hand sides are identical too. This
implies that income is equal to the expected wage given the lottery, regardless
of the sector of employment:
PC (i) ≤ nTH (i)WTHhTH (i)+nN (i)WNhN (i)+
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH+
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN) dfN .
(26)
The optimal choice of hours hTH (i) and hN (i), and probabilities nTH (i)
and nN (i) satisfies the first-order conditions of the following problem:
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max
C (i)1−σ − 1
1− σ + nTH (i)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH (i))ω iν
+nN (i)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN (i))ω iν + (1− nTH (i)− nN (i))
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν ,(27)
subject to (26). These first-order conditions are:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH (i))ω iν −
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν + C (i)−σ
WTHhTH (i)
P
= 0 , (28)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN (i))ω iν −
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν + C (i)−σ
WNhN (i)
P
= 0 , (29)
nTH (i)κ (1− ψ − hTH (i))ω−1 iν + C (i)−σ
nTH (i)WTH
P
= 0 , (30)
nN (i)κ (1− ψ − hN (i))ω−1 iν +C (i)−σ
nN (i)WN
P
= 0 , (31)
which in turn imply:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH (i))ω − κ (1− ψ − hTH (i))ω−1 hTH (i) =
κ
ω
(τ)ω , (32)
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κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN (i))ω − κ (1− ψ − hN (i))ω−1 hN (i) =
κ
ω
(τ)ω . (33)
Therefore, hTH (i) = hN (i) ≡ h for all i, and WTH = WN ≡ W. Conse-
quently the four first-order conditions reduce to just two:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − h)ω iν − κ
ω
(τ)ω iν + C (i)−σ
W
P
h = 0 , (34)
κ (1− ψ − h)ω−1 iν + C (i)−σ W
P
= 0 . (35)
Equations (34) and (35) imply that optimal hours are the same for each in-
dividual and do not depend on WP . However, heterogeneous individuals choose
diﬀerent probabilities, therefore the law of large numbers is not applicable.
Let us define n (i) ≡ nTH (i) + nN (i) and n ≡
R 1
0 n (i) di. It is easy to
verify that the elasticity of aggregate labour supply:
ϑ (nh)
ϑW/P
W/P
nh
=
ϑn
ϑW/P
W/P
n
,
is infinite. Therefore, similarly to the indivisible labour model, individual
heterogeneity in itself does not guarantee that the labour supply has finite
elasticity. Whether or not this is the case depends on the choice of equi-
librium and how the aggregate variables are derived from the preferences of
heterogeneous individuals.
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